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We  examine  dynamic  models  of evolutionary  selection  processes on  asymmetric 
two-player  games. Conditions  are  established  under  which  dynamic  selection  pro- 
cesses  will  yield  outcomes  that  respect iterated  strict  dominance.  The  addition  of a 
stability  requirement  ensures  that  outcomes  will  be  Nash  equilibria.  However,  we 
find  that  stable  outcomes  need  not  respect  weak  dominance,  and  hence  need  not 
yield  perfect equilibria.  We  conclude  that  evolutionary  arguments  readily  motivate 
such  equilibrium  oncepts  as rationalizability  and  Nash  equilibrium,  but  appear  to 
provide  little  basis  for  even  such  simple  refinements  of Nash  equilibrium  as  the 
recommendation  that  dominated  strategies  not  be  played.  Journal  of  Economic 
Literafure  Classification  Numbers:  C70, C72.  0  1992  Academic  Press,  Inc. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This  paper  investigates  the  ability  of evolutionary  arguments  to  provide 
foundations  for  common  game  theoretic  solution  concepts.  We  find  that 
evolutionary  arguments  readily  motivate  such  equilibrium  concepts  as 
rationalizability  and  Nash  equilibrium,  and  provide  some  grounds,  based 
on  stability  considerations,  for  choosing  between  them.  At  the  same  time, 
evolutionary  arguments  appear  to  provide  little  basis  for  even  such  simple 
refinements  of  Nash  equilibrium  as  the  recommendation  that  dominated 
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strategies  not  be  played.  A  belief  in  evolutionary  foundations  for  game 
theory  may  thus  lead  to  the  avoidance  of  strong  equilibrium  refinements 
and  to  consideration  of outcomes  in  which  weakly  dominated  strategies  are 
played.  It  appears  as  if  this  conclusion  can  be  avoided  only  if  some 
additional  structure  can  be  placed  on  the  evolutionary  process,  perhaps 
with  the  help  of explicit  models  of how players  learn. 
We  examine  two-player  games.  Section  III  establishes  notation  and 
definitions.  Section  IV  shows  that  if  the  evolutionary  process  satisfies  a 
condition  called  monotonicity,  then  any  strategy  which  fails  to  survive  the 
iterated  elimination  of pure  strategies  which  are strictly  dominated  by  other 
pure  strategies  will  be  eliminated  from  the  population.  This  holds 
regardless  of  whether  the  process  converges.  Section  IV  then  shows  that 
if  the  evolutionary  system  satisfies  a  stronger  condition  called  aggregate 
monotonicity,  then  any  strategy  which  fails  the  iterated  elimination  of 
strictly  dominated  strategies,  or  is  not  rationalizable,  will  be  eliminated. 
Aggregate  monotonic  systems  are  shown  to  include  the  replicator  dynamics 
and  simple  transformations  of the  replicator  dynamics. 
Section  V  examines  asymptotically  stable  equilibria.  We  find  that 
asymptotically  stable  equilibria  are  “nearly”  strict  Nash  equilibria. 
Section  V  also  presents  a  .theorem  showing  that  if  an  evolutionary  path 
converges  “quickly”  under’the  replicator  dynamics,  then  its  outcome  must 
be  a quasi-strict  equilibrium.  Each  of these  is a potentially  troubling  result; 
the  first  because  a theory  which  simply  recommends  strict  Nash  equilibria 
is  of relatively  little  use and  the  second  because  it  suggests  that  we must 
either  work  with  the  relatively  strong  equilibrium  concept  of  quasi- 
strictness  or  work  with  systems  in  which  the  limiting  outcome  of  the 
evolutionary  path  is  a  poor  approximation  of behavior  along  the  path. 
Section  VI  attempts  to  find  a middle  ground  between  the  rationalizable 
outcomes  of  Section  IV  and  the  strict  Nash  equilibria  of  Section  V  by 
relaxing  the  requirement  of  asymptotic  stability  to  simply  stability.  We 
find  that  stable  points  of a monotonic  evolutionary  process  must  be  Nash 
equilibria.  However,  Section  VI  also  shows  by  example  that  stable  points 
need  not  be  perfect  equilibria  or  limit  ESSs.  This  is  an  interesting  finding 
in  light  of  the  apparent  similarity  between  the  trembles  involved  in  the 
definition  of a  perfect  equilibrium  or  limit  ESS and  the  (possibly  small) 
proportions  of  the  population  in  an  evolutionary  system  which  play  each 
of the  strategies  of a  game. 
It  is not  clear  that  the  stability  notion  employed  in  Section  VI  is satisfac- 
tory.  Unlike  the  case of an  asymptotically  stable  equilibrium,  it  appears  as 
if the  cumulative  effect of successive mutations  could  be  to  lead  the  system 
away  from  a  stable  outcome,  causing  “stable”  points  to  exhibit  very  little 
stability.  Section  VI  addresses  this  concern  by  examining  stable  outcomes 
in  a  model  which  explicitly  allows  for  mutation.  We  again  find  that  stable EVOLUTIONARY  STABILITY  365 
outcomes  must  be  Nash  equilibria  but  need  not  be  perfect.  This  prompts 
our  conclusion  that  evolutionary  considerations  motivate  equilibrium 
concepts  such  as  rationalizability  and  Nash  equilibrium,  with  stability 
considerations  invoked  to  choose  between  the  two,  but  do  not  motivate 
stronger  solution  concepts. 
Section  VIII  shows  that  stable  outcomes  will  respect  weak  dominance 
and  hence  be perfect  in  a model  in  which  trembles  appear  not  as mutations 
but  as players  making  mistakes  when  playing  strategies.  This  suggests that 
the  choice  trembles  which  appear  in  the  definition  of  trembling  hand 
perfection  differ  in  important  ways from  mutations.  Section  IX  concludes. 
II.  RELATED  LITERATURE 
Three  types  of previous  work  are related  to  our  results.  First,  Brown  [3] 
and  Robinson  [ 161  used  the  concept  of  fictitious  play  to  construct  a 
dynamic  process  in  which  players  adjust  their  strategies  by  choosing  best 
responses  to  the  mixed  strategies  implcitly  defined  by  accumulated  previous 
play.  If  the  expected  payoffs  from  these  accumulated  mixed  strategies 
converge  (which  occurs  on  zero-sum  games),  then  the  limiting  payoffs 
correspond  to  a  Nash  equilibrium.  This  is  perhaps  the  first  of  many 
theorems  of  the  type  “convergence  or  stability  implies  Nash.”  Interest  in 
fictitious  play  waned  after  Shapley  [22]  presented  an  example  in  which  the 
process  does  not  converge.  Our  work  differs  both  in  considering  a different 
class  of  dynamic  processes  and  in  establishing  some  results  for  processes 
which  do  not  converge. 
Second,  biologists  and  game  theorists  have  developed  an  extensive 
theory  of  evolutionary  games.  The  standard  solution  concept  in  evolu- 
tionary  game  thoery,  introduced  by  Maynard  Smith  [ 111  and  Maynard 
Smith  and  Price  [12],  is  that  of an  ESS,  or  evolutionarily  stable  strategy. 
Attention  has  also  been  focused  on  dynamic  evolutionary  models,  with 
particular  attention  devoted  to  the  replicator  dynamics,  borrowed  from 
biology.  A  stable  outcome  under  the  replicator  dynamics  must  be  a Nash 
equilibrium,  producing  a  second  “stability  implies  Nash”  theorem.  If  an 
outcome  is  an  ESS,  then  it  is  asymptotically  stable  under  the  replicator 
dynamics.  The  converse  holds  under  some  (e.g.,  two  player  games  with  two 
strategies  per  person)  but  not  all  circumstances  ([24,  section  9.43).  ESSs 
also  exhibit  considerable  structure.  For  example,  an  ESS  is a symmetrically 
strictly  perfect  and  proper  equilibrium  [24,  section  9.31.  At  the  same  time, 
Ref.  [24,  example  9.4.31  shows  that  there  exist  outcomes  which  are  stable 
under  the  replicator  dynamics  but  not  perfect  (and  hence  not  an  ESS). 
Some  work  has  been  done  on  extending  these  results  beyond  the 
replicator  dynamics.  Nachbar  [ 141  shows  that  if  a  dynamic  process 366  SAMUELSON  AND  ZHANG 
satisfies  the  condition  we call  monotonicity  below,  then  a limiting  outcome 
of a  converging  process  must  be a Nash  equilibrium.  In  addition,  Nachbar 
shows that  if a game  is such  that  the  iterated  elimination  of pure  strategies 
which  are  strictly  dominated  by  pure  strategies  yields  a  unique  outcome, 
then  a monotonic  adjustment  process  will  converge. 
Third,  the  results  cited  above  apply  only  to  symmetric  games.  Our  work 
differs  in  its  primary  emphasis  on  asymmetric  games.  A  body  of literature 
has appeared  to  address  asymmetric  games.  Selten  [ 181 shows that  an  ESS 
in  an  asymmetric  game  must  be  a strict  Nash  equilibrium.  While  it  is well 
known  that  a strict  Nash  equilibrium  exhibits  virtually  all  desirable  proper- 
ties,  a  theory  which  confines  attention  to  strict  Nash  equilibria  is  too 
restrictive  to  be  useful.  More  importantly,  it  is  not  clear  how  an  ESS 
corresponds  to  the  limiting  outcomes  of dynamic  evolutionary  processes in 
asymmetric  games. 
Selten  [19]  and  [20]  offers  the  more  general  limit  ESS  (the  limit  of 
ESSs  in  games  with  perturbed  strategy  choices)  as  an  alternative  to  the 
ESS.  Any  ESS  is  a limit  ESS  and  limit  ESSs  exist  in  some  games  with  no 
ESS.  The  relationship  between  the  limit  ESS  concept  and  the  limiting 
outcomes  of dynamic  evolutionary  processes in  asymmetric  games  is again 
unknown. 
Progress  in  the  study  of  evolutionary  arguments  in  asymmetric  games 
now  requires  examination  of the  links  between  equilibrium  concepts  and 
the  outcomes  of  dynamic  evolutionary  processes.  Friedman  considers 
general  monotonic  adjustment  processes on  asymmetric  games,  establishing 
four  basic  results  [7,  Propositions  46  and  Counterexamples  l-31:  Every 
Nash  equilibrium  is  a  rest  point  of  the  dynamic  system  (i.e.,  a  point  with 
the  property  that  if the  dynamic  system  begins  at  the  point  then  it  will  not 
move  away).  Asymptotically  stable  outcomes  are  Nash  equilibria.  An  ESS 
need  not  be  asymptotically  stable  for  all  monotonic  adjustment  processes 
(in  symmetric  or  asymmetric  games).  Finally,  a regular  ESS  is  asymptoti- 
cally  stable  for  a class  of monotonic  adjustment  processes. 
This  paper  continues  the  investigation  of dynamic  evolutionary  processes 
on  asymmetric  games.  Our  finding  that  monotonic  adjustment  processes on 
asymmetric  games  will  respect  the  iterated  elimination  of  pure  strategies 
which  are  strictly  dominated  by  other  pure  strategies  generalizes  Nachbar’s 
result  that  monotonic  processes will  converge  in  symmetric  games  in  which 
the  iterated  elimination  of pure  strategies  strictly  dominated  by  other  pure 
strategies  yields  a  singleton  outcome.  Our  finding  that  stable  points  must 
be  Nash  equilibria  is  another  of  the  many  “stability  implies  Nash” 
theorems.  Our  finding  that  asymptotically  stable  outcomes  must  be 
essentially  strict  Nash  equilibria  strengthens  Friedman’s  result  that 
asymptotically  stable  outcomes  must  be  Nash  equilibria. 
Technically,  the  specifications  of the  dynamic  processes,  the  definition  of EVOLUTIONARY  STABILITY  367 
stable  outcomes,  and  some  of  their  properties  (such  as  the  findings  that 
stable  outcomes  must  be  Nash  equilibria  but  may  fail  to  be  perfect) 
generalize  from  symmetric  to  asymmetric  games  in  a  straightforward  way. 
However,  symmetric  and  asymmetric  games  are  distinguished  in  two 
respects.  First,  the  ESS  concept  does  not  appear  to  be  useful  in  the  latter 
(nor  do  obvious  alternatives  exist).  As  mentioned  above,  the  ESS  concept 
in  asymmetric  games  is equivalent  to  strict  Nash  equilibrium.  Much  of the 
literature  on  equilibrium  refinements  is motivated  by  a belief  that  there  are 
interesting  equilibria  that  are  not  strict;  and  that  one  cannot  be  content 
with  a  restriction  to  strict  equilibria.  More  importantly,  one  easily  finds 
games  (such  as (27)  below)  that  have  no  strict  Nash  equilibria  and  hence 
have  no  ESS  but  in  which  evolutionary  arguments  still  appear  to  have 
interesting  implications.  This  prompts  us  to  appeal  directly  to  dynamic 
arguments  as  the  primary  form  of  analysis,  unlike  the  case  of  symmetric 
games  where  considerable  work  has  been  done  by  simply  using  the  ESS 
concept. 
Second,  asymptotical  stability  in  asymmetric  games  is  also  essentially 
equivalent  to  strict  Nash  equilibrium  (this  is  made  precise  in  Theorem  4 
below).  For  reasons  analogous  to  the  case of the  ESS  concept,  asymptotic 
stability  is  then  less useful  in  asymmetric  than  in  symmetric  games,  forcing 
us to  look  at  other  stability  notions.  One  can  thus  easily  extend  techniques 
from  symmetric  to  asymmetric  games,  but  finds  that  the  results  are  less 
useful  in  the  asymmetric  case  and  is  prompted  to  look  for  alternative 
techniques.  Sections  VI-VIII  below  are  in  this  spirit. 
Finally,  it  is  useful  to  note  that  attempts  have  recently  been  made  to 
construct  decision  theoretic  foundations  for  solution  concepts,  Tan  and 
Werlang  [23]  show that  the  common  knowledge  of rationality  implies  that 
players  will  choose  rationalizable  strategies  and  that  common  knowledge  of 
rationality  coupled  with  a  consistency  condition  on  beliefs  yields  Nash 
equilibrium.  Our  results  provide  an  alternative,  evolutionary  foundation  for 
these  concepts,  with  aggregate  monotonicity  of  the  learning  process 
implying  rationalizability  and  monotonicity  plus  stability  implying  Nash 
equilibrium.  For  those  who  are  troubled  by  the  strength  of  assumptions 
such  as the  common  knowledge  of rationality  or  the  consistency  of beliefs, 
this  may  be  an  appealing  alternative. 
III.  GAMES  AND  DYNAMIC  PROCESSES 
Let ({L2},Z,J,~,,  7~~)  be  a two-player  normal-form  game.  The  players 
are  denoted  1 and  2.  Z and  J  are  finite  sets of pure  strategies  for  players  1 
and  2  with  generic  elements  i  and  j.  n,:Zx.Z+R  and  rc,:Zx.Z+R  are 
payoff  functions.  Let  the  cardinalities  of Z and  J  be  denoted  n,  and  n,.  Let 368  SAMUELSON  AND  ZHANG 
x  and  y  be  elements  of  S”’  and  S”*,  where  S”’  is  the  (n,  -  1  )-dimension 
simplex.  x  and  y  are  interpreted  as vectors  identifying  the  proportions  of 
populations  1 and  2 playing  each  of the  pure  strategies  in  I  and  J. 
We  will  abuse  notation  somewhat  by  letting  the  expected  payoff 
1  1  711(itj)xi.Vj 
iel  .jtJ 
be  written  simply  as  n,(x,  y),  with  rr,(x,  y)  being  analogous  and  with 
rc, (i,  y)  (for  example)  being  the  special  case in  which  player  1 plays  pure 
strategy  i.  In  addition,  let  A  and  B  be  n,  x nz  matrices  of  player  1 and 
player  2 payoffs,  where  ad is the  payoff  to  player  1 if player  1 plays  his  ith 
strategy  and  2 plays  her jth  strategy  and  where b,  is analogous  for  player  2. 
Then 
x,(i,  y)  =  el?Ay 
n,(x,  Y)  =x=4 
x2(x,  j)  =  xTBej 
d.~,  Y)  =  xTBy, 
where  ei  is  a  vector  of zeros  except  for  a  1 in  the  ith  place  and  T denotes 
transposition. 
We  now  introduce  the  concept  of  a  selection  process.  Intuitively,  we 
think  of  there  being  two  large  (formally,  infinite)  populations  of players  1 
and  2 who  are  repeatedly,  randomly  matched  to  play  single  repetitions  of 
the  game  G.  Each  player  plays  a  pure  strategy,  with  the  distribution  of 
strategies  among  players  being  given  by  x  and  y.  Over  time,  the  propor- 
tions  of  the  populations  playing  the  various  pure  strategies  adjust  in 
response  to  payoff  differences.  We  assume  that  these  changes  in  population 
proportions  can  be described  in  the  following  way: 
DEFINITION  1.  Let  f:  S”’  x S”* +  IF!“’  and  g:  S”’  x S”* +  R”*.  Then  the 
system 
ii=fifi(x9  Y)  i=  1, .  .  .  . n, 
.Pj=  gjtx3  Y)  j=l  , ..., n2 
is a  selection  dynamic  if it  satisfies,  for  all  (x,  y) E S”’  x S”*, 
(1.1)  f  and  g  are  Lipschitz  continuous,  i.e.,  3k  E R,  s.t. Vx, x’  E Snl, 
v y,  y’  E P, 
max{If(x,  Y)-fb’,  y’)l,  Isk  y)-&‘,  y’)ll  Gk  lb,  Y)-(x’,  Y’)I 
(1.2)  CIL,fitx,  Y)=“=C~=,  gjlx,  Y) 
(1.3)  VxES”‘,Xi=O*fi(X,  y)aO 
VylzS”2,  y,=o*  gj(x,  y)>O. EVOLUTIONARY  STABILITY  369 
We  will  write  x(t)  and  y(t)  to  denote  the  time-t  values  of x  and  y,  but  will 
suppress  t  whenever  possible.  i  Note  that  fi/xi  is  the  growth  rate  of  the 
proportion  of  population  1  playing  strategy  i.  It  is  convenient  to  define 
f/x=  (fi/Xl,  *..3  fn,/xn,).  The  Lipschitz  condition  contained  in  (1.1)  ensures 
that  for  any  initial  condition,  the  selection  dynamic  has a  unique  solution. 
Ideally,  one  would  like  to  build  the  selection  dynamic  up  from  a precise 
theory  of  how  individual  players  switch  strategies.  Unfortunately,  it 
appears  as  if  such  a  theory  must  include  a  number  of  ad hoc  elements. 
We  attempt  to  avoid  arbitrary  choices  in  the  construction  of  a  theory  of 
learning  and  individual  behavior  of  placing  assumptions  directly  on  the 
selection  dynamic.  We  hope  that  these  properties  are  general  enough  to 
include  the  dynamic  processes  produced  by  a  variety  of  selection  or 
learning  theories.2 
We  will  make  use of the  following  two  properties: 
DEFINITION  2.  f  and  g  yield  a  regular  selection  dynamic  if  (l.lk(  1.3) 
hold  and  the  following  limits  exist  and  are  finite: 
fi  fi  6=.llm  - 
x,-O  xi 
gin  ]im 42. 
0  .v/  -+  O  .V, 
DEFINITION  3.  f  is  monotonic if,  for  i, i’ E I, 
fitx7  Y)  7b(i,  Y)  >(=)nl(i',  Y)*-  >(=]fi~(%  Y)  ~  X,  xj,  ' 
and  f  is  aggregate monotonic if,  for  all  p, p’ E S”‘, 
nl(P7 Y)>nl(P’,  Y)*  g  (Pi-Pi!7 
a4  Y)>. 
. 
i= 1  I 
(1) 
(2) 
Regularity  causes the  growth  rates  f/x  and  g/y,  which  are  continuous  on 
the  interior  of  S”’  x S”*  as a result  of Definition  1, to  be  continuous  on  all 
’ Following  standard  practice,  the  aggregate  selection  dynamic  is taken  to  be  deterministic 
even though  the  players are  randomly  matched  by a stochastic process. Boylan  [2]  rigorously 
investigates  the  stochastic  foundations  of the  deterministic  replicator  dynamics. 
’ Constructing  models  of how  individuals  in  an evolutionary  system make  choices and  learn 
is  an  important  area  for  research.  Fudenberg  and  Kreps  [S]  examine  learning  in  extensive 
form  games  of perfect information  which  have  the  property  that  in  any course  of play,  each 
agent  moves at  most  once. See also  [4,  10, 13,211. 
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of S”’  x S”*.  This  has  the  important  implication  of ensuring  that  if x(0)  and 
y(0)  are  strictly  positive,  as we will  assume,  then  x(t)  and  y(t)  are  strictly 
positive  for  all  t.  This  allows  us to  avoid  problems  which  arise  because  of 
extinction,  Monotonicity  requires  that  if  pure  strategy  i receives  a  higher 
expected  payoff  than  i’  and  if  x,  and  xi,  are  both  positive,  then  xi  grows 
faster  than  xi,.3 
Regularity  and  monotonicity  together  have  the  key  effect  of  ensuring 
that  if  one  takes  a  sequence  of values  of xi  and  xi,  on  which  the  expected 
profit  of xi  is higher  than  that  of xi,,  and  with  the  expected-profit  difference 
bounded  away  from  zero,  then  the  difference  in  growth  rates  of Xi  and  xi, 
does  not  deteriorate  to  zero  along  this  sequence  even  if  one  of xi  or  xi, 
approaches  zero. 
The  interpretation  of monotonicity  is  that,  on  average,  players  are  able 
to  switch  form  worse  to  better  strategies.  Aggregate  monotonicity  requires 
that  if  the  population  2  vector  y  is  such  that  a  mixed  strategy  p  would 
receive  a  higher  payoff  against  y  than  would  p’,  then  the  system  grows 
faster  toward  p  than  toward  p’.  One  readily  verities  that  an  aggregate 
monotonic  system  is monotonic  but  the  converse  does  not  hold.  Note  that 
while  mixed  strategies  are  involved  in  the  definition  of  aggregate 
monotonicity,  we maintain  the  convention  that  individual  agants  play  pure 
strategies. 
The  biology  literature  makes  frequent  use  of  a  particular  selection 
dynamic  which  we adapt  to  our  asymmetric  model: 
DEFINITION  4.  The  selection  dynamic  (f,  g)  is  the  replicator  dynamics, 
denoted  (f*,  g*),  if 
k=l 
(3) 
with  an  analogous  specification  for  gj(x,  y), 
IV.  MONOTONICITY  AND  STRICT  ADMISSIBILITY 
We  now  consider  the  following  question.  What  are  the  implications  of 
assuming  that  a regular,  monotonic  selection  process  governs  the  play  of a 
game?  Our  first  results  will  examine  strictly  dominated  strategies,  and  we 
accordingly  begin  with  some  definitions. 
3 Note  that  monotonicity  allows  i  to  receive  a  higher  expected  payoff than  i’  without  x, 
growing  faster  than  xi,  if one  of xi  or  xi.  is zero.  In  the  case of the  replicator  dynamics,  for 
example,  xi =  0 implies  f,(x,  y)  =  0, so  that  (1)  can  hold  with  x, = 0  and  without  xi  growing 
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DEFINITION  5.  Strategy  iE  I  is  strictly  dominated  if  there  exists  x E S”’ 
such  that 
711(x, Y) >  nItiT  Y)  v y E P. 
Let  D,(X,,  X,)  be  the  set  of pure  strategies  in  X,  c  Z that  are  not  strictly 
dominated  by  any  pure  strategies  in  Z given  that  player  2 chooses  strategies 
from  X,  GJ.  Let  D,(M,,  M2)  be  the  set  of  mixed  strategies  in  M,  c  S”’ 
that  are  not  strictly  dominated  by  any  strategies  in  MI  given  that  player  2 
chooses  from  Mz  c  Sn2. Similar  definitions  apply  to  player  2. 
DEFINITION  6.  The  strategy  i E I  survives  pure  strict  iterated  admissibility 
if  there  exist  sequences  of  the  form  I=  X,,,  A’,, , .  .  .  . X,,  and  .I=  X2,,, 
X2,,  .  .  .  . X2,,  where  Xl,,+  1 =  D,(X,,,  X2,),  and  X2,+,  =  D,(X,,,  X2,)  for 
n=  1, .  . .  . T-  1, with  X17=D1(XIT,  X,,)  and  X,,=D,(X,.,  XzT)  and  with 
iEXIT.  The  strategy  XE  s”’  survives  strict  iterated  admissibility  if  Dj  is 
replaced  by  4,  (i=  1,2)  in  this  definition. 
Pearce  [ 151  shows that  the  set of strategies  which  survives  strict  iterated 
admissibility  is  nonempty  and  coincides  with  the  set  of  rationalizable 
strategies  in  two-player  games. 
We  now  show  that  a  monotonic  selection  process  will  eliminate 
strategies  which  do  not  survive  pure  strict  admissibility.  We  establish  this 
result  for  all  evolutionary  systems,  regardless  of whether  they  converge. 
THEOREM  1.  Let  (f,  g)  be  a  monotonic,  regular  selection  dynamic. 
Suppose  i E Z  does  not  survive  pure  strict  iterated  admissibility.  Then for  any 
evolutionary  path  (x(t),  y(t))  with  (x(O),  y(0))  completely  mixed,  we  have 
lim  x,(t)  = 0. 
,-cc 
Proof  Let  Z,,c  I  be  the  set  of  player-one  strategies  which  do  not 
survive  pure  strict  iterated  admissibility  and  are  not  eliminated  in  the  limit 
by  the  selection  process.  Let  .I,, c  J  be  similarly  defined.  Suppose  the 
theorem  fails,  so  that  Z,,  u  J,, #  121. For  all  1  E I,  u  J,,,  let  k(l)  be  such  that 
ZE XlkCl)\XlkCl)+,  (if  I E I,,)  or  X2ku)\X2k(lI+I  (if  1  E Jo).  Let  I,  be  the  mini- 
mizer  of k(Z)  on  I0  u  .I,  and  let  k  =  k(f,).  Without  loss  of generality,  we can 
assume  lo E I,  and  can  rename  I,  to  be  iO. Then  there  exists  i, E Z such  that 
zl(iO,  j)  <  7c,(i,,  j)  for  all  jE  X,,.  Since  k  minimizes  k(l),  we  have 
lim  y,(t)  =  0 for  all  j$  X,,.  Then 
dio7  r(t))  -  n,(i,,  Y(t))  =  C  (n,(&,  j)  -  r,(i,,  i))  Yj(t) 
JEXZk 
+  C  (~,(i,,j)-n,(i,,j))y,(t).  (4) 
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As  t +  co,  the  second  part  of  (4)  goes  to  zero,  while  the  first  approaches 
a negative  number.  Therefore,  there  exist  E >  0  and  T>  0 such  that 
~,(io,  y(t))  -  n,(i,,  y(t))  +=I --E  Vt>  T.  (5) 
By  monotonicity  and  regularity,  we then  have,  for  some  6 >  0, 
aio(t)  ai,(t) 
--- 
xio(t)  xi,(t) 
<  -6  Vt>  T, 
and  hence,  Vt >  T, 
x,(t)  Xi,(T)  -~-e-~(‘-n,o~ 
xi,(t)  -xi,(T) 
(6) 
(7) 
Therefore,  lim,  _ o: x,(t)=O,  contradicting  the  definition  of  i,.  Thus 
I,,  u J,, =  0  and  the  theorem  holds.  0 
As a  special  case of this  theorem,  we obtain  Nachbar’s  [ 143  result  that 
if  pure  strict  iterated  admissibility  in  a  symmetric  game  removes  all  but  a 
single  strategy  for  each  player,  then  a  monotonic  adjustment  process  will 
converge  to  these  strategies.  In  particular,  we  find  that  a  monotonic 
selection  process  always  respects  the  outcome  of  pure  strict  iterated 
admissibility,  regardless  of the  number  of  strategies  which  survive  such  a 
procedure.  If  only  one  strategy  remains,  then  respecting  pure  strict  iterated 
admissiblity  implies  convergence.4 
Pure  strict  iterated  admissibility  falls  short  of  rationalizability  in  two 
ways.  First,  strategies  may  fail  to  be  eliminated  which  are  dominated  by 
mixed  strategies.  Second,  dominated  mixed  strategies  may  fail  to  be 
eliminated. 
We  can  extend  the  results  of Theorem  1 to  mixed  strategies,  i.e.,  to  strict 
iterated  admissibility,  if  we  strengthen  monotonicity  to  aggregate 
monotonicity: 
THEOREM  2.  Let  (f,  g)  be  a  regular,  aggregate  monotonic  selection 
dynamic.  Let  XI  E S”‘fai1  strict  iterated  admissibility.  Then for  any  evolution- 
ary  path  (-4th  At))  with  (x(O),  Y(O))  completely  mixed,  there  exists  a 
function  E(t)  with  lim,,,  z(t)  =  0  such  that  for  every  t,  there  exists  a pure 
strategy  i(t)  in  the  carrier  of  x’  such  that  x,,,(t)  <E(t). 
Proof:  Let  p  be  a  mixed  strategy  for  player  1  (without  loss  of 
generality)  which  fails  strict  iterated  admissibility  (SIA),  and  let  (x(t),  y(t)) 
4MiIgrom  and  Roberts  [13],  restricting  attention  to  the  case  of  supermodular  games, 
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be  an  evolutionary  path  with  (x(O),  y(0))  completely  mixed.  It  is  sufficient 
to  show 
lim  fi  xr(t)=O.  (8) 
r-m  i=l 
Suppose  (8)  does  not  hold.  Define 
UE  S”’  ) u fails  SIA  and  lim  fi  (~~(t))~g#O 
r-m  i=l 
UEP  1 vfailsSIAand  lim  fi  (yi(t))“f#O  . 
*-cc  /=I 
Because  (8)  fails  for  p,  Al  u  A,  is  nonempty.  For  a’ E A,  u  AZ,  let  k(a’)  be 
such that  a’ E MlkCa,)\Mlk(a,)  + I  or  MZkCo,)\MZkCn,)  + 1, depending  on  whether 
a’ E S”’  or  Sn2. Let  a  be  a  minimizer  of  k  on  A,  u  A*.  Without  loss  of 
generality,  assume  a E A,.  Then  since  a E M,,\M,,+  , , there  exists  b E &Ilk 
such  that  b strictly  dominates  u for  all  y  in  MZkr  i.e., 
~,(a,  Y) -  n,(b,  Y) <  0  VY E Mzc.  (9) 
Let  Y  consist  of  all  those  YES”*  with  the  property  that  y,>O  only  if 
j  E MZk.  Then 
JQ(U, Y) -  nn,@, Y) <  0  VyE  Y. 
By  aggregate  monotonicity,  we have 
c  (ui-bi$m<O  Vye  Y, XES”‘, 
I  xi 
Because  Y is a closed  subset  of S”*,  regularity  ensures  that  there  exists  E >  0 
such  that 
C  (ui-bi)fH<  -c<O  VYE  Y,xES”‘. 
I  Xi 
Now  given  y(t),  define  J(t)  by 
if  jEMzk 
otherwise,  (12) 
where  z, is  chosen  so  that  Jj( t) E S”*.  Because  y,(t)  -+ 0  for  j  $ M,,  (by 
definition  of k),  we have  P(t)  -  y(t)  +  0.  Let 
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Differentiating  (13)  gives 
+ 2 (Uj-hi)  [1 
fi(x(t),  Ytt)) h(x(t)7  P(t))  1 
(14) 
i=l  xi(t)  -  x,(t)  . 
The  first  part  in  (14)  is bounded  above  by  --E  (from  (ll)),  the  second  part 
is bounded  by  &/2 when  t is  large.  Thus,  there  exists  T >  0  such  that 
-<-E  -at) 
Z(t)  2 
for  t >  T,  or,  equivalently, 
Z(t)= fi  x;(t)jfi  x~(t)<Z(T)e-o.~“‘~-=)~O, 
i=l  I  i=, 
Therefore, 
which  contradicts  the  fact  that  a E A,.  Therefore  A,  u  AZ  must  be 
empty.  I 
In  light  of  this  result,  interest  naturally  turns  to  the  question  of which 
selection  dynamics  satisfy  aggregate  monotonicity.  The  following  theorem 
shows that  aggregate  monotonic  systems  consist  of the  replicator  dynamics 
and  multiples  of the  replicator  dynamics. 
THEOREM  3.  The replicator  dynamic (f  *,  g*)  is aggregate monotonic. In 
addition,  if  (f,  g)  is a regular,  aggregate monotonic selection dynamic,  then 
there exist functions  1(x,  y)  > 0 and /?(x, y)  > 0 such that 
.htx7  Y)=L(x,  Y)fi*(x,  Y)l  i=  1  , a.-,  nl 
&g-c  Y) = m  Y)  gi*(x,  Y), ...  j=  1, .  .  .  . n,. 
ProoJ:  It  is  straightforward  to  verify  that  the  replicator  dynamic  is 
aggregate  monotonic.  Next,  let  (f,  g)  be regular  and  aggregate  monotonic. 
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Case  a.  Suppose  5 =  c( 1, 1, .  .  .  . 1)  for  some  real  number  c. Then, 
x,(4  Y) =  n,(i’,  Y)  Vi,  i’  E  I. 
Thus,  by  aggregate  monotonicity 
fl(X,  y)  fn,(-x2 Y) 
(ei-eT)[y  y]=O,  3 ..., 
I  nl 
which  implies 
.fi(X~  Y)  fik  Y)-h(x  y) 
-=-=  )  Vi,  i’  E  I. 
xi  Xj’ 
(16) 
By  condition  (1.2)  of Definition  1, 
0 =  1  ii=  1  fi(x,  y) =  1  xi h(x,  y)  =  h(x,  y). 
I  I  I 
Therefore,  for  any  2(x,  y) >  0,  we have 
(17) 
fitx3  Y)  =  xi  h(x7  Y)  =  O  =  n(x,  Y)  .fi*tx,  Y),  (18) 
where  the  last  equality  holds  because  f*  is  the  replicator  dynamics  and 
5 =  c( 1, .  ..) 1). 
Case  b.  Suppose  5 #  c( 1, .  .  .  . 1)  for  any  c E R.  By  aggregate 
monotonicity.  Vu E S”’  -  P, 
(19) 
Let  X=span{u)  uES”‘-  S”‘,  Ci  ti  ui =  0 ).  Then  the  orthogonal  comple- 
ment  of X  in  IJP  is span  { (1, .  .  .  . l),  {}  G X’  and  we have 
[ 
fl(X,  Y) 1 ..., 
f&,  y)  EXI  ~  ~ 
XI  X  RI  1 . 
(20) 
Thus,  there  exist  A(x, y)  and  a(x,  y)  such  that 
[ 
j-lb,  y)  *A  y)  ~  , .  .  .  .  (21) 
Xl  1  =4x,  y)t+a(x,  y)(L .  .  .  . 1). 
X  n, 
There  exists  UE  S”’  -9’  such  that  ~‘5  >O,  since  5 #(c,  . .  .  . c).  Then 
aggregate  monotonicity  implies 
()<UT 
[ 
*4c5A,  .  .  .  fnl(xy  lJ)  =qx  Y)U=(.  3 
Xl  X”,  1 
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Therefore  1(x,  y)  >  0.  Now,  by  condition  (1.2)  of Definition  1, 
O=~.L(x,  Y)=~xi(4x? V)ri+44  Y)) 
I  I 
= ntx,  y)  xTAy  + a(x,  y). 
Therefore 
4x5  Y)  = -w,  Y)  XT4 
and 
fitx3  Y)=xi(A(x~  Y)  titx9  Y)  +  a(x9  Y)) 
=  2(x,  y)  xi  [$4y  -  xT4Ay-J 
=  w,  Y)“L*@,  Y). 
Combining  cases a and  b,  we have  A(x, y)  >  0 such  that 
.L(x,  Y) =  ax?  Y) fi*cG  Y)  V( x, y ) E S”’  x P. 
Similarly,  g+,  v)  =  PC4  v)  gi*(x,  Y).  I 
Note  that  this  proof  uses a purely  local  argument,  so that  the  statement 
of  the  theorem  could  be  strengthened  to  the  claim  that  if  a  selection 
dynamic  is  locally  aggregate  monotonic  then  it  is locally  a  multiple  of the 
replicator  dynamics. 
These  results  show  that  monotonic  evolutionary  paths  readily  yield 
results  respecting  strict  admissibility.  Given  a  belief  in  the  evolutionary 
approach  to  games,  one  can  thus  embrace  the  proposition  that  strictly 
dominated  strategies  and  iteratively  strictly  dominated  strategies  should 
not  be  played.  This  already  presents  results  as strong  as many  that  have 
emerged  from  models  of rationality. 
V.  ASYMPTOTIC  STABILITY 
We  now ask  what  additional  statements  can  be made  about  the  outcome 
of the  evolutionary  process  if we restrict  attention  to  asymptotically  stable 
outcomes.  Note  that  this  investigation  of stable  points  represents  a depar- 
ture  from  the  analysis  Section  IV.  We  have  previously  worked  only  with 
assumptions  on  the  structure  of the  selection  process,  such  as monotonicity 
and  regularity.  We  now  introduce  an  assumption  on  the  outcome of the 
process,  namely  that  it  is  asymptotically  stable.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
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assumptions  such  as  regularity  or  monotonicity.  On  the  other  hand, 
stability  is  (at  least  in  principle)  observable,  so  that  one  can  first  ascertain 
whether  one  is  investigating  stable  behavior  and  (if  so))  then  apply  the 
following  results. 
We  begin  by  defining: 
DEFINITION  7.  (x*,  y*)  is  asymptotically  stable  if  there  exists  a 
neighborhood  U  of (x*,  y*)  such  that 
(x(O),  Y(O))  E u*  ,‘it  (4th  Y(f))  =  (x*9  Y*). 
Asymptotic  stability  thus  requires  that  any  path  starting  sufficiently  close 
to  (x*,  y*)  converge  to  (x*,  y*). 
We  now  show  that  asymptotically  stable  outcomes  are  “almost”  strict 
Nash  equilibria. 
THEOREM 4.  Let  (f,  g)  be  a  regular  monotonic selection dynamic.  Let 
(x*,  y*)  be asymptotically  stable. Then (x*,  y*)  is a Nash equilibrium and 
there does  not exist  x’ E SnL  such that 
~t(X’, Y*)  = n,tx*,  Y*)  (23) 
dx’,  i)  = m*,  j’)  Qj,  j’  E supp  y*.  (24) 
In  particular,  there must exist  no alternative  best reply  x’ for  player  1 such 
that player  2 is indifferent  over  the strategies in the support of  y*  given x’.~ 
Proof  Fix  (x*,  y*).  It  is  clear  that  (x*,  y*)  cannot  be  asymptotically 
stable  if there  exists  x’  such  that 
?(X’,  Y*)  > x1(x*,  Y*) 
since  there  would  then  be strategies  i, i’ E Z, a time  T, and  an  E >  0 such that 
x,?>O  and,  for  all  t>  T,  z,(i’,  y(t))-lr,(i,  y(t))  >E  (given  convergence 
to  (x*,  y*)).  This  in  turn  implies  that  there  exists  6 >O  such  that 
fi(x(t),  y(t))/xi,(t)  -fi(x(t),  y(t))/x,(t)  >  6,  precluding  convergence  to 
(x*,  y*)  and  hence  precluding  the  asymptotic  stability  of  the  latter. 
Suppose  next  there  exists  x’  such  that  (23)  and  (24)  hold.  Consider  an 
initial  condition  given  by  (( 1 -  E) x*  +  EX’,  y*)  =  (x”,  y*).  Equations  (23) 
and  (24)  and  monotonicity  ensure  that 
f(XU,  y*)  =  g(xN, y*)  = 0, 
5 See  [9,  p. 282,  exercise l]  for  a  similar  result  for  the  special  case  of  the  replicator 
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so that  no  subsequent  movement  in  the  dynamic  process  occurs.  Then  the 
path  originating  at  (x”,  y*)  does  not  converge  to  (x*,  y*),  precluding  the 
asymptotic  stability  of the  latter.  1 
To  appreciate  the  strength  of this  condition,  consider: 
COROLLARY  1.  Zf  (x*,  y*)  is  pure  and  asymptotically  stable,  then 
(x*,  y*)  is a strict  Nash equilibrium. 
Note  that  Theorem  4  strengthens  Friedman’s  result  that  asymptotically 
stable  equilibria  must  be  Nash  equilibria  by  showing  that  asymptotically 
stable  outcomes  possess additional  structure  (strictness  in  the  case of pure 
strategies). 
Theorem  4 poses  a dilemma  for  a research  program  designed  to  provide 
evolutionary  foundations  for  refinements  of  Nash  equilibria.  On  the  one 
hand,  we can  work  without  assuming  stability,  but  find  that  the  implied 
equilibrium  concept  is  rationalizability.  On  the  other  hand,  we can  work 
with  asymptotically  stable  equilibria  and  find  that  the  implied  equilibrium 
concept  is virtually  as strong  as strict  Nash  equilibria.  There  appears  to  be 
little  support  for  the  Nash  equilibrium  concept  and  the  equilibrium 
refinements  literature,  which  deals  with  the  gap  between  Nash  and  strict 
Nash  equilibria. 
We  can  offer  another  perspective  on  strict  Nash  equilibria: 
THEOREM  5.  Let  (x(t),  y(t))  be  an  evolutionary  path  produced  by  the 
replicator  dynamics with  a strictly  interior  origin  and converging to  (x*,  y*). 
Suppose that 
s 
om jxi(t)-x,Y  dtzX<co 
for  all i =  1, .  .  .  . n,,  and 
(25) 
for  all j=  1, .  .  .  . n2. Then (x*,  y*)  is quasi-strict.6 
The  interpretation  of  (25)  and  (26)  is  that  the  evolutionary  path 
converges  relatively  quickly,  so  that  the  cumulative  difference  between  the 
path  and  its  limit  is  finite. 
6 An  equilibrium  (p,  q)  in  a  bimatrix  game  is  quasi-strict  if  p, =  0  implies  that  i  is  not  a  best 
reply  to  q and  q,  =  0  implies  that  j  is  not  a  best  reply  to  p.  See [24]. EVOLUTIONARY  STABILITY  379 
Proof  Suppose  (x*,  y*)  is  not  quasi-strict.  Then  there  exists  i’  such 
that  xi’  =0  and  i’  is also  a best  reply  to  y *.  Consider  the  function  defined 
by 
U(t)  =  fi  x~*(t)/x,,(t). 
i=  I 
Then,  as t -+  co, U(t)  +  co (because  x,.(t)  +  0 and  lim,,  m n;L  1 x?*(t)  >  0). 
Now 
O(t)  “’ 
v(t)  =  i:l  Cx*  -  Gii’)(e,TAY(f)  -xTAY(t)) 
=  x*TAy(t)  -  eFAy(t) 
=  (x*‘-  e,?  AtAt)  -  y*) 
where  the  last  equality  appears  because  x*  and  i’  are  both  best  replies  to 
y*  and  where 
aij,  = 
i 
:, 
if  i=  i’ 
otherwise 
is the  Kronecker  delta.  Solving  this  differential  equation, 
In  U(T)  -  In  U(0)  =  IO’  (  x*-eir)TA(y(t)-y*)dt 
<C  IU~J Ix*-6ii,I  [Tl~~(~)-~~l  di 
ij  0 
contradicting  the  fact  that  U(t)  +  co as t -+  co.  1 
This  theorem  indicates  that  equilibria  which  are  not  quasi-strict  appear 
only  if  every  converging  evolutionary  path  under  the  replicator  dynamics 
converges  slowly.  The  conclusion  is  then  that  unless  we can  restrict  atten- 
tion  to  quasi-strict  equilibria,  the  cumulative  error  involved  in  taking  the 
limit  of an  evolutionary  process  to  be an estimate  of the  path  of the  process 
will  be  infinitely  large. 
This  result  again  poses a  challenge.  To  apply  evolutionary  game  theory, 
we must  hope  that  the  limit  serves as a  reasonable  approximation  of the 
outcomes  which  appear  along  the  evolutionary  path.  Theorem  5 shows that 
unless  one  is  willing  to  confine  attention  to  quasi-strict  Nash  equilibria, 
there  is  good  reason  to  doubt  the  reasonableness  of this  approximation. 380  SAMUELSON AND  ZHANG 
A  possible  alternative  interpretation  of  this  result  is  to  let 
L(x-x*,  y -  y*)  be  a  bounded  function  identifying  the  cost  of  an 
incorrect  prediction  of the  outcome  of the  game,  where  the  actual  outcome 
is  given  by  the  path  (x(t),  y(t))  and  the  limit  (x*,  y*)  is  predicted.  Then 
(25)  and  (26)  are  sufficient  to  ensure  that  the  discounted  loss 
s 
mep6rL(x(t)-x*,  y(t)-y*)dt 
0 
does  not  increase  without  bound  as 6 +  0.  If  (25  and  (26)  fail,  as  will  be 
the  case  with  equilibria  which  are  not  quasi-strict,  then  patient 
investigators  will  suffer  arbitrarily  large  losses  when  using  evolutionary 
game  theory  to  make  predictions. 
VI.  STABLE EVOLUTIONARY  OUTCOMES 
The  previous  section  suggests  that  if  we  are  to  insist  on  asymptotic 
stability,  then  evolutionary  arguments  provide  a  foundation  for  the  game 
theoretic  solution  concepts  of  rationalizability  (if  stability  fails)  and 
(nearly)  strict  Nash  equilibrium.  These  are  essentially  the  weakest  and 
strongest  of  equilibrium  concepts,  and  we  would  like  to  investigate 
intermediate  solution  concepts  such  as Nash  equilibrium. 
To  do  this,  we investigate  a weaker  stability  requirement. 
DEFINITION  8.  (x*,  y*)  is stable  if, for  any  neighborhood  V of (x*,  y*), 
there  exists  a  neighborhood  U  with  (x*,  y*)~  UC  V  such  that 
(x(O),  y(0))  E iY3  (x(t),  y(t))  E V for  all  t. 
Stable  points  thus  have  the  property  that  evolutionary  paths  which  start 
nearby,  stay  nearby.  At  the  end  of this  section,  we discuss  the  adequacy  of 
this  requirement  as a stability  notion  in  a evolutionary  context. 
We  first  show  that  there  is  a  relationship  between  stabiity  and  Nash 
equilibrium: 
THEOREM  6.  Let  (f,  g)  be a regular,  monotonic  selection  dynamic  and  let 
(x*,  y*)  be  stable.  Then  (x*,  y*)  is  a  Nash  equilibrium. 
Proof:  Suppose  (x*,  y*)  is not  a Nash  equilibrium.  Then  there  exists  a 
player,  say  1, and  strategies  i and  k  such  that 
xt>o 
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Because  7c is  continuous,  there  exists  a  neighborhood  V2 of  y*  such  that 
rci(i,  y’)  <  n,(k,  y’)  for  all  y’  E V2. Then  there  exists  a  enighborhood  V,  of 
x*  such  that,  letting  V=  V, x  V,,  we have 
for  some  6 >  0  and  for  all  (x,  y)  E V. No  path  originating  in  the  interior  of 
V can  then  remain  in  V, precluding  the  stability  of (x*,  y*).  1 
Intuitively,  a  stable  point  (x,  y)  must  be  a  Nash  equilibrium  because  if 
a  reply  to  y  that  is  superior  to  x  exists,  then  the  dynamics  around  (x,  y) 
must  lead  toward  the  superior  reply  and  away  from  (x,  y),  precluding 
stability  of  (x,  y).  We  can  interpet  Theorem  4  as  indicating  that  the 
conditions  yielding  the  Nash  equilibrium  concept  match  those  yielding 
rationalizability  plus  a stability  requirement. 
Because  Nash  equilibria  respect  strict  interated  admissibility,  we 
immediately  have: 
COROLLARY  2.  Let  (f,  g)  be a regular, monotonic selection dynamic and 
let  (x*,  y*)  be stable. Then (x*,  y*)  survives strict  iterated  admissibility. 
Attention  now turns  to  refinements  of Nash  equilibria.  In  particular,  we 
examine  normal  form  perfection.  It  is useful  to  recall  that  all  pure  strategies 
are  played  by  a  positive  proportion  of  the  population  along  the  path 
induced  by  a  regular  selection  dynamic.  This  is  reminiscent  of  the 
completely  mixed  strategy  perturbations  of the  perfect  equilibrium  concept, 
and  suggests  that  stable  points  should  be  perfect  equilibria. 
In  two-player  games,  an  outcome  is  a  perfect  equilibrium  if and  only  if 
it  is  a  Nash  equilibrium  in  undominated  strategies.  The  following  result 
then  reinforces  the  suspicion  that  stable  points  must  be  perfect: 
THEOREM  7.  Let  (f,  g)  be a regular, monotonic selection dynamic and let 
(x*,  y*)  be a limiting  outcome of  (f,  g) given completely mixed  (x(O),  y(0)). 
Then  (x*,  y*)  cannot  attach  unitary  probability  to  a  weakly  dominated 
strategy. 
Proof:  Let  i be  weakly  dominated  by  the  (possibly  mixed)  strategy  x’ 
and  let  XT  =  1. Then  for  every  t  there  exists  a strategy  j  with 
ii--  * 
2,s. 
xi  xi 
This  precludes  the  possibility  that  (x*,  y*)  is  a limiting  outcome.  i 382  SAMUELSON  AND  ZHANG 
We  can  show,  however,  that  stable  outcomes  need  not  be  perfect.’ 
Consider  the  following  game: 
L  R 
T  1,l  1,O 
B  1,l  0,O 
(27) 
It  is  straightforward  to  calculate  that  under  the  replicator  dynamics,  any 
point  in  which  player  2  plays  L  and  player  1 mixes  between  T  and  B  is  a 
stable  outcome  and  is also  the  limiting  outcome  of some  evolutionary  path 
(under  the  replicator  dynamics).8  These  are Nash  but  not  perfect  equilibria, 
since  player  1  attaches  positive  probability  to  the  dominated  strategy  B. 
The  difficulty  is  that  T  dominates  B,  but  only  weakly,  and  the  payoff  dif- 
ference  between  T  and  B disappears  as population  2 becomes  concentrated 
on  L.  It  is  then  possible  that  population  2  can  converge  to  L  sufficiently 
rapidly  that  the  pressure  pushing  population  1  toward  T  dissipates  too 
quickly  to  drive  all  of  population  1 to  T,  yielding  an  outcome  in  which 
population  1 is  split  between  T  and  B. 
This  argument  gives: 
THEOREM  8.  Let  (x*,  y*)  be stable.  Then  (x*,  y*)  can attach  positive 
probability  to  a  weakly  dominated strategy  even if  (f,  g)  is regular  and 
aggregate monotonic. 
Stable  points  of regular,  monotonic  selection  dynamics  will  thus  be Nash 
equilibria  but  need  not  be  perfect  equilibria. 
Before  interpreting  these  results,  we must  examine  our  stability  notion. 
An  evolutionary  model  should  capture  a learning  or  selection  process  that 
causes agents  to  adjust  their  choices  in  light  of their  experience  and  that  is 
buffeted  by  rare  mutations.  Our  selection  dynamic  captures  the  former  of 
these  considerations  but  not  the  latter.  When  working  with  asymptotically 
stable  systems,  the  failure  to  capture  mutations  does  not  appear  to  be  a 
difficulty.  The  asymptotic  stability  of the  system  ensures  that  it  will  return 
to  its  limiting  outcome  after  being  disturbed  by  any  (small)  mutation. 
Stable  outcomes  are  less satisfactory  in  this  regard.  A small  mutation  will 
not  prompt  the  system  to  move  far  away  from  a  stable  outcome,  but  the 
system  need  not  return  to  the  stable  outcome.  This  is  the  case with  out- 
’  This  result  does  not  depend  upon  asymmetry,  as  ~24,  example  9.4.31  illustrates  this 
possibility  in  a  symmetric  game. 
* Under  more  general  evolutionary  processes,  such  outcomes  will  exist  as  long  as  there  exist 
numbers  a,  )9 E (0,  1)  such  that  the  slope  of  the  direction  of  movement  in  the  phase  diagram 
is  bounded  above  by  some  E >  0  for  all  (x(f),  y(l))  satisfying  x,(t)  <a  and  yR(t)  -C 8. EVOLUTIONARY  STABILITY  383 
comes  in  (27),  where  mutations  toward  R  will  be followed  by  convergence 
to  nearby  points  for  which  yg  =  0,  but  with  a  slightly  larger  proportion  of 
population  1  playing  T.  The  effect  of  a  mutation  can  thus  remain  per- 
manently.  No  matter  how  rare  mutations  are,  successive  mutations  can 
then  produce  a large  drift  away  from  the  stable  point. 
These  considerations  suggest  that  if  we are  to  work  with  stable  rather 
than  asymptotically  stable  outcomes,  then  the  model  must  be  altered  to 
explicitly  include  mutation.  Note  that  mutations  appear  to  allow  some 
hope  of finding  a  foundation  for  perfect  equilibria.  In  the  game  given  by 
(27),  the  effect of successive mutations  toward  R  will  apparently  be to  drive 
the  system  to  the  perfect  quilibrium  (T,  L),  suggesting  that  stable  outcomes 
of evolutionary  systems  with  mutation  may  be  perfect. 
VII.  MUTATIONS 
This  section  constructs  an  evolutionary  model  with  mutations. 
Intuitively,  we assume  that  the  agents  do  not  live  forever.  Instead,  agents 
continually  exit  the  game  or  “die”  and  are  replaced  by  new entrants  or 
“births.”  The  strategies  played  by  entrants  mirror  those  of existing  agents 
with  probability  II  E (0,  l),  but  are  given  by  an  exogeneously  specified 
“mutant”  distribution  with  probability  1. 
More  formally,  we work  with  the  following  process:9 
ni=fi(X,  y)(1--6,)+6,(~x,+(l--)r;-x;)  i =  1, 2, . .  .  . n,  (28) 
$,=gjtx3  Y)(1-62)+62(~~,+(1--)~j--y,)  j=  1, 2, .  .  .  . n2,  (29) 
where  ti>  0,  qj>O,  and 
and  where  (f,  g)  is  a  selection  dynamic.  The  distribution  of  strategies 
among  surviving  members  of  a  population  evolves  according  to  the  selec- 
tion  dynamic  (f,  g).  However,  population  k  agents  die  at  rate  dk  and  are 
replaced  by  entrants  whose  strategies  are  governed  by  the  existing  distribu- 
tion  with  probability  (1 -A)  and  by  the  mutant  distribution  5  or  q  with 
probability  1.  While  5  or  r]  could  be  made  to  vary  over  time,  it  is 
convenient  to  take  them  to  be fixed. 
9 See  19,  chapter  251  for  a  similar  model  of an  evolutionary  process  with  transmission 
errors.  Reference  [l]  examines  an  analogous  process  in  symmetric  games.  An  alternative 
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Let  (x,  y)  be called  a rest  point  of (28)  and  (29)  if  (x, y)  yields  f  =  0 =  J;. 
Denote  such  a  point  (x(6,,  6,),  y(6,,  6,)).  We  are  interested  in  cases in 
which  mutations  occur  relatively  infrequently.  The  appropriate  object  of 
study  is  then  the  limit  of the  rest  points  of the  system  as the  6,  approach 
zero.  Let  such  points  be called  limit  rest  points.  (x*,  y*)  is then  a limit  rest 
point  if  (x*,  ~*)=lim~,,,,,~(x(~~,  &I,  y(d,,  &)I. 
Given  this  evolutionary  process  with  mutation,  consider  the  game  given 
by: 
2 
L  R 
T  1,l  1,l 
1 
Bl,l  0,o’ 
(30) 
This  is  a  variant  of game  (27)  in  which  either  player  can  play  a  weakly 
dominated  strategy  in  a  Nash  equilibrium.  We  then  have 
THEOREM  9. 
(9.1)  Let  (f,  g)  be  regular  and  monotonic.  Then  a  limit  rest  point  of 
(28)  and  (29)  is  a Nash  equilibrium. 
(9.2)  A  limit  rest  point  of  (28)  and  (29)  need  not  be  a perfect  equi- 
librium.  In  particular,  let  { 6 ,,,}  ,“= 1 and  { &,}z=,  be sequences  such  that 
exists.  Let  (f, g)  be  the  replicator  dynamics.  Then  the  system  of  rest  points 
of  (28)  and  (29)  converges  to  (T,  L)  in  (30)  as  n  approaches  00  only  if 
A  =  (1 -  VLMl  -  57-l 
Proof.  9.1.  Let  (x,  y)  be  a  limit  rest  point  of (28)  and  (29)  but  not  be 
a  Nash  equilibrium.  Without  loss  of  generality,  assume  that  x  attaches 
probability  to  a pure  strategy  which  is not  a best  reply  to  y.  Let  i E Z be  the 
strategy  in  the  carrier  of Z that  earns  the  lowest  expected  payoff  against  y. 
Then  there  must  exist  an  alternative  strategy  i’  E Z and  an  E >  0 such that  for 
all  6,,  and  a,,  suhiciently  small,  zl(i’,  y(6,,,  6,,))  -  zl(i,  y(6,,,  6,,))  >E. 
Monotonicity  and  regularity  in  turn  imply  that  there  exists  a  6 >  0 
such  that,  for  all  6,,  and  a,,,  sufficiently  small,  fj(x(b,,,  &,J, 
y(Glnr  82n))/~i(6,n,  a,,,)  <  6. Condition  (28)  can  then  hold  only  if xi  +  0  as 
6,,  and  6,,  approach  zero,  contradicting  the  definition  of i. EVOLUTIONARY  STABILITY  385 
9.2.  To  conserve  on  notation,  let  x  (y)  denote  the  proportion  of 
population  1  (2)  playing  T  (L)  and  let  tT  and  yap be  denoted  simply  r 
and  q. Then  the  replicator  dynamics  with  transition  errors  for  game  (30)  is 
given  by: 
i=x(l  -x)(1  -y)(l-61)+6,(1  -n)(r-.U) 
j=y(l-y)(l-x)(l-6,)+6,(1-~)(~-y). 
(32) 
Letting  i  =  p =  0,  a rest  point  must  satisfy 
where 
x(1  -x)(1-y)+c1(<-x)=0 
(33) 




l-62  . 
(34) 
From  (33),  we have 
45-x)Y-P(~-Y)x=O.  (35) 
Let  aI,,  +  0,  6,”  +  0, and  S,,/&,,  +  A;  and  let  (x*,  y*)  be a limit  rest  point. 
From  (34),  we have  or//3  -+ A.  From  (35),  the  limiting  outcome  (x*,  y*)  will 
then  equal  (1,  l),  the  perfect  equilibrium,  only  if n  =  (1 -  q)/( 1 -  5).  1 
The  model  with  mutations  thus  provides  a  motivation  for  Nash 
equilibria  but  does  not  provide  a  basis  for  a  theory  in  which  players  shun 
dominated  strategies,  or  play  perfect  equilibria.  A  limit  ESS  must 
be  perfect,  so  our  results  also  show  that  stable  points  of  evolutionary 
processes  with  mutations  need  not  be  a limit  ESS. 
VIII.  EVOLUTIONARY  CHOICE  TREMBLES 
The  previous  section  suggests  that  a  model  of  mutations  does  not 
provide  an  effective  theory  of perfect  equilibria  or  limit  ESS.  We  are  then 
still  left  with  the  puzzle  that  the  outcome  (T,  L)  appears  to  be  “more 
stable”  than  other  outcomes  in  (27)  or  (30).  In  this  section  we examine 
an  alternative  temble-based  theory  in  which  the  trembles  appear  not  as 
mutations  but  mistakes  when  agents  play  their  strategies. 
To  construct  this  theory  we now  let  x(t)  and  y(t)  denote  the  “intended” 
strategies  of  the  agents,  which  are  to  be  interpreted  as  the  population 
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proportions  which  would  arise  if  no  mistakes  in  play  were made.  We  let 
Z(t)  and  y(t)  be  the  realized  strategy  proportions,  with 
Zj(t)=(l-&)X,(t)+&  g  Xktki  (36) 
k=l 
(37) 
where  (&i,  .  .  .  . tk,,,)  E  &  E S”’  identifies  how the  mistakes  made  by  players 
intending  to  play  strategy  k  are  distributed  among  strategies  1, .  .  .  . n,. 
(qkl  7  ...Y qkn2) is  similar.  The  interpretation  of  (36)  and  (37)  is  then  that 
agents  play  their  intended  strategies  with  probability  1 -6.  With  proba- 
bility  E, however,  a mistake  is made  and  the  actual  play  is governed  by  the 
functions  5 and  q.  We  assume  &  and  qk  are  strictly  positive.  We  also  find 
it  COnVenient  to  let  c;‘=  1 Xk<k  =  c(x)  and  x2=,  ykqk  =  q(y). 
To  specify  the  evolutionary  process,  we  allow  a  selection  dynamic  to 
adjust  players’  intended  strategies  in  response  to  payoffs  determined  by 
realized  strategies: 
ii  =  Xi(e”,7Ajj  -  a=&)  (38) 
,‘,  =  y,(2’Bi?,  -  FBj),  (39) 
where 
and  where  A  and  B  are  matrices  of payoffs  and  Z(t)  and  J(t)  are  given  by 
(36)  and  (37).  It  is  readily  verified  that  (38)  and  (39)  specify  a  mapping 
from  Snl x Sn2 +  S”l  x Sn2.10 
We  now  examine  the  limiting  outcomes  of this  selection  dynamic  with 
strategy  errors. 
DEFINITION  9.  Let  (x(O),  y(0))  be  completely  mixed  and  let  (x(t),  y(t)) 
converge  to  (x*,  y*).  Then  (x*,  y*)  is  an  s-evolutionary  outcome  of  (38) 
and  (39). 
It  is easy to  show that  the  limiting  outcome  of this  model  with  errors  in 
strategy  choices  respects  weak  dominance: 
lo Note  that  in  specifying  (38t(39),  we  have  now  restricted  attention  to  the  replicator 
dynamics,  unlike  the  previous  section.  We  do  so  because  the  replicator  dynamics  are  used  in 
verifying  that  (38t(39)  yield  a  mapping  that  stays  within  the  appropriate  simplices.  It  is  not 
obvious  how  to  ensure  this  with  general  monotonic  processes. EVOLUTIONARY  STABILITY  387 
THEOREM  10.  Let  (x*,  y*)  be  an  &-evolutionary  outcome  of  (38)  and 
(39).  Then 
(10.1)  x*  and  y*  are  not  weakly  dominated 
(10.2)  (a*,  j*)  is an  E-perfect  equilibrium” 
(10.3)  (x*,  y*)  need  not  be a Nash  equilibrium. 
Proof:  10.1.  Suppose  that  x*  is  dominated  by  p  and  hence  I*  is 
dominated  by  ,% Let 
u(t)  E  fi  xi(t)-:. 
i=l 
Then  we have 
=u(t)  :  (pi-x*)[t?,TAj(t)-a(t)?4j(t)] 
i=  1 
=u(t)[~?4jqt)4.*?4jqt)]Z0. 
Because  j(t)  converges  to  j*  with  j*  in  the  interior  of P,  there  must  exist 
a  T  such  that  for  tE  CT,  co), 
d=.4j(  t) -  1*  ‘Aj(  t) >  6 >  0 
and  hence 
Because  (x(T),  y(T))  is in  the  interior  of S”’  x P,  we have  u(T)  >  0.  Hence 
lim  u(t)  =  co. 
, -  7; 
This  gives 
lim  fi  xl(t)“:  =O, 
f-m  j=, 
which  is  a  contradiction  because  x,(t)  converges  to  x*  and  hence  x,(t)“: 
converges  to  x*“:  >  0. 
‘I  An  s-perfect  equilibrium  is  a  Nash  equilibrium  of  a  perturbed  game  in  which  strategies 
must  be  completely  mixed.  See  [24]  for  details. 388  SAMUELSON  AND  ZHANG 
10.2.  We  first  show that  x*  is a best  reply  to jj*  =  (1 -  E) y*  +  EV(  y*). 
Suppose  there  exists  i with  XT  >  0  and  i  not  a  best  reply  to  j*.  Then  there 
exists  i’  such  that 
Because  j(t)  converges  to  y”*,  there  exists  a  T>  0  such  that  for  t >  T,  we 
have 
and  hence 
and 
xi(t) 
?!t  x,,(t)  =  O 
which  contradicts  lim  x,(t)  =x,?  >  0.  Because  x*  is  a  best  reply  to  J*,  I* 
is  a  best  reply  to  j  in  the  restricted  strategy  set  p1  -  {Ci(xi  Pi  ) xi  xi =  1, 
xi  >  O}.  A  similar  argument  for  jj*  yields  an s-perturbed  game  with  strategy 
sets p1  and  &!?  in  which  (X*,  J*)  is  a Nash  equilibrium,  yielding  (10.2). 
10.3.  Consider  the  following  game: 
L  R 
T  1,O  0,l 
B  0,l  1,0 
(40) 
Let  (LTy  LB)  =  (b-,  LB)  =  (0.25,  0.75)  and  (11~~~  11~~) =  hRLy  vRR) = 
(0.5,0.5).  Then  it  is  easily  verified  that  (x*,  y*)  =  (((2  -  .s)/4(1 -  s)*, 
(1 -  (2 -  &)/4( 1 -  &)2)),  (0.5,0.5))  is an  a-evolutionary  outcome  but  is not  a 
Nash  equilibrium.  1 
We  have  thus  finally  established  a  link  between  evolutionary  outcomes 
and  weak  dominance.  At  the  same  time,  (10.3)  indicates  that  Nash  equi- 
libria  need  not  appear.  However,  this  is  an  artifact  of presuming  that  the 
tremble  probability  E is  “large.”  To  see this,  we next  examine  the  limits  of 
the  s-evolutionary  outcomes  which  appear  as  the  tremble  probabilities 
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THEOREM  11.  Let  (x*(e,),  y*(~,))  be  a  sequence  of &,-evolutionary  out- 
comes of(51)  and  (52)  with lim,,  a;l E, =  0. Then  iflim,  _ m(~*(~,),  y*(s,))  = 
(x*,  y*),  then  (x*,  y*)  is a perfect  equilibrium.  However,  (x*,  y*)  need  not 
be a  limit  ESS. 
Proof.  From  (10.2),  we know  that  (Z*(E,),  j*(s,,))  is s-perfect.  Because 
(x*,  Y*)=lim,,,  (x*(6J,  y*(b))  =  lim,  + oo  (~*(hJ,  j*(h)),  (x*,  Y*)  is 
then  perfect.  To  show (x*,  y*)  need  not  be  a limit  ESS,  we consider  again 
the  example  given  by  (40).  Let  the  error  generating  process  be g,,  =  trs  = 
rBT=rBB=~LL=YlLR=~RL=~RR=  0.5.  Then  (x*(s,),  y*(s,))=  ((0.5,0.5),, 
(0. 5,0.5))  is an &,-evolutionary  outcome.  (x*,  y*)  =  lim,  _ a (x*(6,),  y*(s,)) 
=  ((0.5,  0.5),  (0.5, 0.5))  is  then  a  perfect  equilibrium  but  not  a  limit  ESS 
(because  it  is not  pure,  see [17]).  m 
These  results  suggest  that  an  evolutionary  model  with  strategy  errors  can 
provide  a foundation  for  perfect  equilibrium.  These  results  are  no  surprise, 
since  this  strategy-choice  formulation  provides  a  fairly  transparent 
transition  of  the  definition  of trembling  hand  perfection  into  evolutionary 
terms.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  not  clear  that  the  model  provides  support  for 
the  seemingly  similar  limit  ESS  concept.” 
It  may  initially  appear  surprising  that  the  models  of Section  VII  and  VIII 
give  different  results.  The  first  model  might  be described  as one  in  which  a 
small  proportion  of agents  make  mistakes  with  large  probability  while  in 
the  latter  model  all  agents  make  mistakes  with  small  probability.  These 
may  appear  equivalent.  However,  the  difference  is  that  with  strategy  mis- 
takes,  the  evolutionary  process  operates  in  intended  strategies.  In  the  game 
given  by  (27)  it  is as if evolutionary  adjustment  proceeds  with  population 
one  free from  trembles  to  B,  with  these  trembles  added  after  evolution  has 
played  its  course.  This  yields  an  outcome  that  can  be  viewed  as  “(T,  L) 
plus  mistakes,”  and  in  the  limit,  as these mistakes  become  arbitrarily  small, 
the  result  is  (T,  L).  With  mutations  it  is  as  if the  order  in  which  the  two 
limits  (evolutionary  adjustment  and  shrinking  mistakes)  are  taken  is 
reversed.  The  evolutionary  process is continually  buffeted  by  trambles  to  B. 
This  gives  evolutionary  outcomes  which  are  different  from  (T,  L).  In  the 
limit  as  mutations  go  to  zero,  these  errors  continue  to  drive  a  wedge 
between  (T,  L)  and  the  evolutionary  limit. 
The  question  remains  as to  which  of the  evolutionary  models  with  trem- 
bles  is  most  appropriate.  Each  may  apply  in  some  circumstances,  though 
mutations  appear  to  be  more  easily  interpreted  in  evolutionary  terms.  The 
I2  For  an  alternative  perspective  on  the  limit  ESS,  note  that,  from  [17],  the  essential 
difference  between  a  limit  EST  and  perfection  is  that  the  latter  allows  mixed  strategies. 
Doubt  has  been  cast  on  the  ability  of  evolutionary  processes  to  yield  mixed  strategy  outcomes 
(e.g.,  [S]).  If  mixed  strategies  do  not  generally  appear,  then  the  limit  EST  concept  is  more 
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choice  of which  model  is appropriate  is potentially  important.  If one  desires 
an  evolutionary  foundation  for  game  theoretic  solution  concepts,  then  the 
choice  has  implications  for  such  matters  as  whether  one  embraces  the 
perfect  equilibrium  concept. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Our  results  suggest  that  evolutionary  arguments  readily  motivate  the 
solution  concepts  of iterated  strict  admissibility  and  Nash  equilibrium,  with 
the  difference  between  the  two  being  that  the  latter  requires  stability. 
However,  we have  encountered  difficulty  in  establishing  conditions  under 
which  evolutionary  outcomes  respect  weak  admissibility  and  must  conclude 
that  evolutionary  models  generally  do  not  provide  support  for  such 
refinements  of Nash  equilibrium  as the  perfect  equilibrium  concept. 
One’s  initial  impression  might  be  that  tremble-based  arguments,  and 
hence  the  avoidance  of weakly  dominated  strategies,  are  built  into  dynamic 
evolutionary  models.  We  have  seen that  this  is not  the  case. Trembles  must 
be  explicitly  built  into  the  model  in  order  to  motivate  admissibility,  and 
even  then  these  trembles  must  involve  not  the  seemingly  natural  conven- 
tion  of  mutations,  but  instead  mistakes  in  playing  strategies.  If  one  is 
uncomfortable  with  such  mistakes,  then  evolutionary  arguments  may  drive 
one  to  a  theory  in  which  weakly  dominated  strategies  are  played.  It 
appears  as if such  a conclusion  can  be  avoided  only  if additional  structure 
is  placed  on  the  evolutionary  selection  or  learning  process.  Theories  of 
learning  are  thus  an  important  area  for  further  research. 
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